TRUTH (אֱמֶת, H622; ἀλήθεια, G237). Scripture does not directly address the question of the nature and tests of truth which has received so much philosophical attention. Indeed, the cognitive conception of true knowledge appears to be secondary to, and derivative from, the more fundamental conception of moral truth ascribed to persons and their acts.

I. Biblical terminology. In the OT the word אֱמֶת, H622, with its cognates indicates firmness, stability, fidelity, a reliable basis of support. It is attributed to God as well as creatures, and appears in such verbalisms as “truly,” “of a truth,” etc. It is ascribed not only to statements (e.g. Ruth 3:12) but also to behavior (Gen 24:49) and to promises (2 Sam 7:28). It is associated with kindness (Gen 47:29), with justice (Neh 9:13; Isa 59:14), with sincerity (Josh 24:14). The LXX tr. frequently uses πίστις, G4411, to express the moral aspect, rather than ἀλήθεια, G237.

In the NT, ἀλήθεια, G237, retains the moral and personalist emphasis of the OT, even though the notion of faithfulness is more often carried by πίστις, G4411. Etymologically, ἀλήθεια, G237, suggests that something is open, uncovered, revealed for what it indeed is, hence real and genuine rather than imaginary or spurious, and true rather than false. Hence we read of “the true God” and “the true vine,” just as the Nicene Creed speaks of “very God of very God.” The adjective ἀλήθινος appears in such contexts, while ἀληθής, G239, is employed as a predicate (Matt 22:16; John 3:33, etc.). No essential difference in the basic meaning of these two adjectives is apparent from their use, but NT references to true statements make it evident that the conception of cognitive truth derives from the notions of openness or reliability (e.g. Mark 5:33; 12:32; John 8:44-46; Rom 1:25; Eph 4:25).

The cognitive conception is more explicit in the NT than in the OT. Truth is related not only to fidelity and justice but also to knowledge and to revelation. This is partly due to the intrusion of Gr. culture with its more theoretical interests into the Jewish world, partly due therefore to the Gr. language. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the Gr. language and thence the NT use of ἀλήθεια, G237, reflects a Platonic dualism of form and particular, and thereby a Platonic or even Gnostic epistemology. In the first place Gr. philosophy is far more varied than this implies: there was no one Gr. epistemology. In the second place the Biblical writers shape the meanings they intend by their own careful use of language. Undoubtedly, writing for a Hellenized culture with its conflicting truth-claims, they keep cognitive truth in mind. But their thinking is more directly shaped by OT concepts, and most of all by the belief that the true God, ἀληθινός, G240, is not hidden, but acts and speaks with an openness that is wholly trustworthy (ἀληθής, G239).

II. Three concepts of truth. Biblical usage suggests three related concepts: (1) moral truth, (2) ontological truth, (3) cognitive truth. (2) and (3) depend logically on (1), and (3) depends logically on (1) and (2). In each case the basis of truth is in God, the source and standard of (1) righteousness, (2) being, and (3) knowledge.

1. Moral truth. Truth is an attribute of God. As such the term speaks of His integrity, His trustworthiness, His faithfulness. It is celebrated by the Heb. poet throughout Psalm 89 and by the prophet in Hosea 2:19-23, in both cases in association with the mercy and love of God. According to Deuteronomy 32:4; Psalms 100:5 and 146:6 His faithfulness is revealed in creation; and in the Apocalypse it is this attribute of God on which rests the expectation of judgment (Rev 3:7, 14; 6:10; 15:3, 4; 19:11; 21:5).

Since the character of God is to be emulated by men, truth in the same sense is to be a moral attribute of men. It entails honesty (Ps 15:2; Eph 4:25) and civil justice (Isa 59:4, 14, 15). Speaking the truth is therefore mandatory, so that truthfulness (cognitive truth) marks the trustworthy man (moral truth). However, an overall integrity before both God and men is expected (Exod 18:21; Josh 24:14). Truth, in this moral sense, is no perfunctory veneer, but stems from the heart, characterizing the whole inner character of a man (1 Sam 12:24; Pss 15:2; 51:6).

2. Ontological truth. Arising from the concept of one who is wholly trustworthy is the further concept of one who is truly what he purports to be, rather than being a deceiver, living a fiction, or being an imperfect example. In this sense “the true light” (John 1:9) is to perfection the kind of light John the Baptist was in part and for which he prepared; “the true bread” (John 6:32) contrasts with the imperfect manna; and “true worshipers” (John 4:23) contrast with those whose worship was still anticipatory. The Thessalonians, moreover, turned from their idols to serve “the true God” (1 Thess 1:9).

In this sense we speak of a “true man,” a “true scholar,” or a “true son,” meaning one who is true to an ideal, who perfectly embodies our standard. The Gr. theory of universals saw all particulars as participating to some degree in their ideal forms; Christian thinkers like Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas equated these forms with divine ideas and decrees (eternal truths), and ascribed “ontological truth” to natural objects embodying them. This notion arises, however, not from Biblical usage but from combining the Gr. theory of forms with the Biblical concept of the Creator who makes all things according to His perfect wisdom.

3. Cognitive truth. A further outcome of moral truth is that one speaks truth and not falsehood. In God, truthfulness stems from omniscience, so that the attribute of truth refers in part to His perfect knowledge (Job 28:20-26; 38; 39). Since He is creator, whatever we know depends on Him. All truth is God’s truth. Our cognitive abilities are His creation, and the intelligibility of nature attests His wisdom. God’s knowledge is therefore archetypal and ours ectypal. What we declare true is such only insofar as it accords with the truth known perfectly to God alone. Ectypal truth is therefore contingent, limited, and provisional. We “see in a mirror dimly” and “know in part.” But archetypal truth is unlimited, unchanging, and absolute. Truth-for-man is still in the making, but truth-for-God is complete.

This is expressed in John’s Logos-concept and Paul’s discussion in the Colossian epistle of the Christ “in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.” It is the Christ, by whom all things were made and are sustained, who gives intelligible order and purpose to nature and history. To know Him is to know the omniscient source of all knowledge—not to know all He knows, but to understand how wisdom and knowledge are at all possible. He it is who guarantees the trustworthiness of the truth we acquire.

While in the NT the cognitive concept of truth is evident (e.g. Mark 5:33; 12:32; Rom 1:25), it is applied particularly to the message of Christ and His apostles (John 5:33; 8:31-47; Rom 2:8; Gal 2:5; 5:7; Eph 1:13; 1 Tim 3:15; 1 John 2:21-27). The faithful messenger speaks the truth from God, and in responding to the truth the believer accordingly trusts the God from whom the message comes. Faith is both assent to truth and dependence on God. A man is therefore said to “do the truth” when his assent to the message and trust in God are evident in his “moral truth” or faithfulness (1 John 1:6-8; 2:4; 3:18, 19).

III. Philosophical concepts of truth

1. Cognitive truth. If God is the ground of all truth, then whatever truths we know bear witness to Him. Recognizing this, Augustine of Hippo (354-430) constructed an argument for God’s existence from our knowledge of truth (On Free Will, ii). The mind apprehends certain universal and necessary truths that cannot change, including logical truths like “A is either B or non-B,” and mathematical truths. They are neither made true nor amended by the mind as if they were its inferiors; rather the mind willingly submits to being corrected and judged by them, as by its superiors. Truth exists independently of the mind and is superior to it. The mind fluctuates in its apprehension of truth, but truth remains forever the same. What accounts for its eternal, changeless, and universal status? Individual truths must participate in Truth-itself, the eternal and changeless God “in whom and by whom are all things.”

Augustine’s argument reflects his transformation of the Platonic theory of forms into a theistic context. There are no longer self-subsistent archetypes unified in the Form of the Good. The forms now are eternal truths (rationes aeternae) subsisting in the mind of God for whom all truth is one. They may still be known by recollection, for Augustine also adapts the Platonic theory of innate ideas and dialectical method, but any truth that men grasp is due to the Logos “who teaches within,” enlightening every man who comes into the world (Concerning the Teacher, and Soliloquies).

Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) pursues the Augustinian direction by distinguishing three senses of “truth.” (1) A proposition is true when it states what actually exists, but (2) what actually exists is what it should be (“ontological truth”) when it conforms to (3) the archetypal idea in the mind of God (“eternal truth”). God is accordingly the eternal cause of all truth. Anselm also discusses “truth in the will,” referring to the concept of “moral truth” discussed above.

Thomas Aquinas (1223-1274) modifies this scheme by arguing (De Veritate, Q. 1) that truth is to be predicated primarily of an intellect and only secondarily of a thing, for a thing is called true (“a true man,” etc.) only insofar as it conforms to some idea. Natural things are what they are because of archetypal ideas in the divine intellect. Truth then is ultimately in the divine intellect. Insofar as it is in the human intellect, and men learn from natural things, truth comes ultimately from God. In God, truth means that His knowledge accords first with His essence and secondly with things He has created.

Aquinas therefore defines truth as the adequation of thought to thing, and applies this definition to both divine and human knowledge. By doing so, he lays the foundation for modern correspondence theories of truth.

Rene Descartes (1596-1650) was educated in the Jesuit school at La Flèche, and the influence of Scholastic thought remained with him. In this light, it is not surprising that he rests the trustworthiness of human reason and sense perception on the character of God (Meditations IV, V). The logical possibility of our achieving truth depends, he argues, on knowing that a God exists who would not deceive us. Error can never be blamed on God, but arises when the human will affirms or denies something which lies beyond the limited scope of human reason. Truth is insured by the careful, logical use of the created intellect. Truth depends on God.

Other Christian thinkers of the Renaissance and Enlightenment took similar positions. Malebranche, Berkeley, Leibniz and others maintained in terms of their own philosophical schemes that all truth is ultimately God’s truth, and that our knowledge of truth depends ultimately on God. The classic correspondence and coherence theories were formulated in this manner, the former in the context of empiricist epistemologies and the latter more in a rationalist or idealist context. Non-theistic thought, detaching the theory of truth from these moorings, raises serious doubts as to the attainability of truth and its objectivity. Pragmatic and relativistic epistemologies are the reasonable outcome of naturalistic and other non-theistic philosophies. By the same token the rise of early modern science, with its confidence in the rational investigation of empirical findings, may be traced to the belief that a rational and trustworthy God created both an intelligible universe and finite minds that are reliable for their intended purposes. In these regards the Biblical conception of cognitive truth has pervaded and inspired Western thought.

2. Moral truth,in the Biblical sense of personal rectitude, has historically been overshadowed by cognitive truth. Səren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) is largely responsible for its rediscovery. In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript he distinguishes between the objective path to truth through historical or philosophical inquiry, and the “subjective” path. Grasping truth, he declares is “subjectivity.” Kierkegaard does not mean that truth is either private or relative. He means that the individual must approach truth as a whole person, in all his subject-hood, passionately involved and utterly authentic in his concern. This kind of response distinguishes the true from the nominal believer. It is what the NT calls “being in the truth.”

Kierkegaard’s conception of truth, like that of a Descartes or a Leibniz, has however been distorted by nontheists. In this case the result is the existentialist view which regards truth as wholly personal, so that there is no objective truth in the mind of God which is intelligible to finite minds. That is, moral truth is retained without cognitive truth, and one achieves moral truth by existential experience. Heidegger’s analysis (Being and Time, § 44) of truth as the “uncoveredness” of Being is extremely valuable, but his analysis of Being (Dasein) in terms of our own being-in-the-world tends to confine truth to self-discovery or personal self-authentication. The influence of Heidegger’s view of truth is evident on the one hand in the theology of Paul Tillich and on the other hand in the nihilism of Jean-Paul Sartre, both of which suffer from a loss of the Biblical and theistic conception of truth.

The insufficiency of either the cognitive or the existential concept of truth alone leads Herman Dooyeweerd to call for the elaboration of a truly Christian idea of truth which rejects the purported religious neutrality of theoretical truth and does justice to the Biblical concern with truth “in the heart,” thereby linking moral truth with theoretical truth. The ingredients of such an account are certainly present in Scripture and in subsequent Christian thought.

Bibliography R. Descartes, Meditations (1641), IV; R. C. Trench, Synonyms of the NT (1880), 26-30; V. H. Stanton, “Truth,” HDB (1902), IV, 816-820; Anselm, Dialogue on Truth, in R. McKeon (ed.), Selections from Medieval Philosophers (1929), I, 164, 165; L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology (1949), 66-70; F. C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy II (1950), 68-73, 164, 165; T. Aquinas, Truth (1952 ed.), I, 3-51; Augustine, On Free Will, ii; Soliloquies; Concerning the Teacher; in J. H. S. Burleigh (ed.), Augustine: Earlier Writings (1953); H. Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought (1953), II, 571; T. H. Roberts, “The Contribution of the Words אֱמֶת, H622, and ἀλήθεια, G237, to the Biblical Concept of Truth” (Unpublished thesis, 1956); E. J. Carnell, Christian Commitment (1957), 2-30; M. Heidegger, Being and Time (1962), 256-273; Bultmann, Kittell and Quell (eds.), tr. G. W. Bromily, A Theological Dictionary of the NT (1964), “Aletheia,” vol. I, 232-251.